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Summary findings
The current social security systems in many OECD  contribution accounts in a new mandatory saving pillar.
countries were adopted before World War 11,  when  If developing countries follow the path the OECD
private financial markets were underdeveloped or in  countries once followed, they will encounter
disrepute. They expanded sharply in the 1950s and  dramatically escalating contribution rates, great
1960s, when real wages and population were growing  intergenerational transfers, and related problems. Given
rapidly. Under those circumstances, it seemed natural to  their rapid rate of demographic aging, it is important  for
rely on a publicly managed payroll-tax-financed pay-as-  them to establish a multi-pillar system from the start.
you-go (PAYG)  system.  James argues that the World Bank position differs
But in the past 40 years, real wage growth  has slowed  from those of the International Labour Organisation
and population growth has come to a halt in OECD  (ILO) and International Social Security Association
countries, so tax rates must go up sharply if PAYG  (ISSA)  because the Bank:
systems are to be retained. It has become increasingly  * Is more concerned about how social security systems
important to minimize work disincentives and to increase  affect the general economy.
labor productivity through capital accumulation, which  *  Is troubled by inequities often found in current
the public pillar is not well-suited to do. Shifting partial  systems (in practice, if not on paper).
responsibility to privately managed plans that are funded  *  Believes that behavioral responses and factors of
and that tie benefits to contributions is likely to improve  political economy sometimes make nonviable the design
economic growth and provide better benefits than will  changes the ILO and ISSA  recommend for public
continued reliance on a payroll-tax-financed PAYG  systems.
system, concludes the World Bank.  *  Values risk diversification. (Financial markets are
The OECD countries can shift gradually to a two-pillar  now both better and more global than before, so
system by reducing and flattening the benefits in their  multipillar systems benefit from revenue and managerial
public pillars and using the released resources (plus some  diversification, including international diversification.)
additional contributions) to build funded defined
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A Defense of Averting the Old Age Crisis
Estelle James
Lead Economist
Poverty  and Human  Resources  Division
Policy Research  DepartmentI am pleased  that representatives of the ISSA and  the ILO have given
considerable thought and space to the ideas presented in the World Bank report,
Averting the  Old Age Crisis: Policies to  Protect the  Old and Promote  Growth. This
was well  indicated in the article by Roger Beattie and Warren McGillivray  "A
Risky  Strategy..  .".  published  in  issue  3-4/95  of  the  International  Social
Security Review.'  I am also pleased that the Editorial Board of the Review has
offered me the chance to  write a reply  to some of the issues raised. These issues
are indeed complex and controversial, and we can all benefit from a thorough
public discussion.
Averting the Old  Aae Crisis documents in great detail the many problems we
found  with dominant  old  age  systems  today--publicly  managed  pay-as-you-go defined
benefit  schemes.  These problems  include high  and rising  payroll  tax rates,
evasion, early retirement, misallocation of public resources, lost opportunity
to  increase long  term saving, failure to redistribute to low income groups,
unintended inter-generational transfers (often  to  high income  groups), growth of
a large hidden implicit public pension debt, and fiscal  nonsustainability of the
current system.  As a result,  existing  systems have not  always protected the old,
they especially will not protect those who grow old in the future, they have not
helped  (and may have hindered) economic growth, and their equity implications
have been questionable.
Now,  each of these problems was not found in every country, but every
country  we examined--both developing  and industrialized--exhibited many of these
problems.  We concluded that these problems were inherent in the economics and
politics of pay-as-you-go defined benefit schemes. That is why we recommend a
radically different system for countries that are just starting up, as well as
for countries whose old systems have broken down.  In this article I briefly
summarize our recommendations, analyze why representatives of the ISSA and the
ILO came to quite different policy conclusions, and take up selected issues.
2I. The  World Bank's  Recommended Multi-Pillar System
In place of existing systems, Avertina recommends a multi-pillar system
that puts  greater emphasis on  saving and that utilizes  a mix  of public  and
private management, full funding and pay-as-you-go financing.
Our preferred system consists of two mandatory pillars and one voluntary
pillar,  each  using  a  different  administrative and  financing mechanism.  One
mandatory pillar would be fully funded and privately managed--for the reasons
given below.  This pillar is ideally suited for handling peoples, saving.  But
since we cannot rely on a privately managed pillar to provide a social safety
net, a publicly managed tax-financed  pillar is needed for redistribution. And a
third  pillar, that is  voluntary, would  be used by people who want additional old
age  security.  All  three  pillars  would  co-insure  against  life's  many
uncertainties.
Let me start by discussing the  pillar  for  saving, because this is the most
controversial part of our recommendation.  This  pillar is  mandatory  for  the
same reason that current systems  are mandatory--because a significant number of
people may be shortsighted, may not save enough for their old age on a voluntary
basis, and may become a burden on society at large when they grow old.  It will
link benefits closely to contributions (usually  through fully portable defined
contribution plans), to  discourage the  evasion and labor  market distortions that
we have observed in many countries.  But the most important characteristics of
this pillar  are  that it would be  fully funded and privately  managed;  these
characteristics determine the nature of our multi-pillar system.
Funding is important for several reasons.  First, it makes costs clear up
front so countries won't be tempted to make promises  today that they will be
unable to keep tomorrow.  Unrealistic benefit rates have often been set at the
beginning of pay-as-you-go  'PAYG)  schemes, because their costs are hidden and
postponed, but as the years pass these costs become quite transparent, increase
exponentially and countries find themselves saddled with a huge fiscal burden.
This cost escalation will  take place with particular speed in rapidly aging
3developing countries.  Full funding  diminishes the  future tax increases that  will
be needed, gives a reality-check to pension promises and thereby helps to avoid
this dilemma.
Second, funding prevents inadvertently large intergenerational transfers
from young people to older workers.  Once an unfunded system is set in motion,
intergenerational transfers occur automatically as a result of the aging and
maturation process, sometimes in ways that people did not expect and would not
have chosen.  For example,  because of the  benefit  and financing formulas commonly
used, some of the gainers are rich people in the earlier generations while some
of the losers are poor people in the later generations.
The third reason for favoring full funding of the saving pillar is that
this may be used to  help build long term  national savings; I will say more about
this effect  below.  For all  these reasons, we argue  that  a  funded defined
contribution pillar is a better way to  provide the  earnings-related part of old
age systems than is a pay-as-you-go defined benefit pillar.
Averting argues that the funds in this pillar should be privately and
competitively managed--to maximize  the  likelihood that economic  rather  than
political  objectives will determine the investment strategy,  and  thereby to
produce the best allocation of capital and the highest return on savings.  This
is especially important given the large sums of money that would be involved in
a mandatory saving plan; the experience of many countries, including countries
that  are  now  in  transition,  indicates  that  governments  are  not  the  best
allocators of national capital.  More specifically,  the limited available data on
returns to publicly versus privately managed pension reserves  show that the
former earned less than the latter and in many cases lost money throughout the
1980's.  This happened largely because public managers were required to invest
primarily or exclusively  in government securities or  loans to failing  state
enterprises, at low  nominal interest  rates that  became  negative real rates  during
inflationary periods.  Publicly managed funds  also run the danger of encouraging
deficit finance and  wasteful spending  by the  government, because they constitute
a hidden and exclusive source of funds.
4Competitively managed funded pensiboi  plans, in contrast, are more likely
to enjoy  the benefits of investment diversification, including  international
diversification, that protects them against inflation and other risks, and to
spur  financial market  development,  thereby  enhancing economic  growth. The private
managers could be chosen by workers in the case of personal saving plans or by
employer and union representatives if the funded pillar  is based on employer-
sponsored group plans.
(But  two caveats: countries  must have at least rudimentary capital markets
before  they can put the funded pillar  in place, and considerable government
regulation  and  regulatory  capacity are  need  in  order to  prevent  fraud  and
excessive  risk. These caveats mean that some countries are not yet ready to
handle a funded pillar for mandatory retirement saving.)
The redistributlve pillar. However, some  people, who are low wage-earners
for  most or unempooyed for part of their  working lives, will not be able to save
enough to  keep themselves  out of poverty in  old age as  well.  Others may run into
a spell of bad returns, despite the government regulation of the  investment
companies.  For these  reasons  complete reliance  on  a  privately-managed pillar for
saving is not enough; a redistributive pillar is needed to keep old people out
of poverty, and this must be publicly managed and financed.
The redistributive pillar would resemble existing public pension systems
in that it would be publicly managed and tax-financed.  However, unlike most
current systems, the reformed  public pillar would be targeted toward low income
groups--providing a social  safety net for the  old.  To accomplish this, benefits
could be flat, mean-tested, or could provide a minimum pension guarantee.  The
tax base should be as broad as possible--either general revenue finance or a
payroll tax without a ceiling  on taxable earnings.  Because of its limited scope
and broad tax base, tax rates to support this pillar could be sharply reduced
relative to their current levels.
A third pillar, voluntary saving and annuities, would offer supplemental
retirement income for people with the means and inclination to save more, just
as voluntary saving does today.
5All  three  pillars  would  co-insure  against individual  and  economy-wide risk,
providing better protection to the old than any single mechanism could alone.
Remember  the old  adage--don't put all your  eggs in one basket--yet  this  is
exactly what we have been forcing many workers to do. Risk diversification is
especially important given the long time  periods and great uncertainty involved.
In fact, most upper income  people realize this and have very diversified sources
of old age income, including privately managed investment income, while lower
income groups are much more heavily reliant on publicly managed pay-as-you-go
programs. We believe that the national mandatory plan should also give these
lower  income  groups  the benefits  of  risk  diversification,  to  bolster  the
protection they get through the public pillar.
The report does  not have  a simple  blueprint that is  good for  all countries.
One way that variation could take  place is through the relative size of the two
pillars. While each pillar should be large enough to benefit from economies of
scale, the division of responsibility and contributions between the two could
vary, roughly between one-third and two-thirds of the total. The nature of the
two pillars also offers choice.  The public pillar could be means-tested, flat or
could provide a minimum pension guaranty. The funded pillar could be based on
occupational plans or on personal saving plans.  Further, different countries
should approach this multipillar system at different speed, as some  (e.g. in
Africa) do not yet have the regulatory  or financial  market capacity to establish
the funded pillar,  some  (e.g.  in Latin America) need to reform urgently, and
others  (e.g.  the OECD countries) can make a gradual transition.  The important
thing is for all countries to  have a vision of  where they are going, and to start
moving in that direction.
This is not an ivory tower  proposal. The key features in this framework--
separate mechanisms for  redistribution  and saving, shared responsibility between
the  public and private sectors, funded  and tax-financed plans--have already been
adopted by several countries, including Chile and Argentina  (where the funded
pillar is based on personal saving plans), Australia and Switzerland  (where it
is  based on mandatory employer-sponsored  plans), and  Denmark and the  Netherlands
6(where  employer-sponsored plans  are  mandated  by  widespread collective  bargaining,
rather than legislation).
II. Why Do the ISSA and the ILO Make Different Policy Reconmendations?
The Review article basically accepts our diagnosis of the problems with
social security systems today.  And we agree  on several much-needed reforms--the
importance of raising the retirement age, of having a strong governmental role,
and therefore of increasing the governmental capacity in developing countries.
But the authors of the article, and by inference the organizations that they
represent  (the ILO and the ISSA) come up with a very different basic solution
from  ours.  Rather than  recommending  a fundamental  change in  system, they  believe
that the  old system can  be "fixed  up"  by appropriate design changes. In  contrast,
we believe that a fundamentally different system is preferable, especially for
countries that are just starting out or expanding their systems. Why do we come
to such  different conclusions about  policy, when we largely  agree on diagnosis?
It seems to  me that there are four underlying reasons for this divergence:
(1) The  Review  authors  are not  concerned  about  the  impact of  social
security systems on the broader economy, and/or they believe these effects are
negligible, while we believe they can be substantial;
(2)  The Review article defines current systems as equitable--as they often
look on paper--and  is less troubled by the inequities that we often find in
practice;
(3)  The Review article seems to hold that people, acting as citizens and
individuals, will not thwart the recommended design changes, while we believe
that behavioral responses and political economy factors sometimes make these
changes non-viable; and
(4)  The  Review  articel  does  not  acknowledge  the  benefits  of  risk
diversification or weight them very  heavily, while we believe diversification is
very important for programs with a long time horizon in a very uncertain world.
7I consider each of these in order.
Effects on economic growth
Most important, the World Bank report was very concerned about the effect
of old age programs on the broader economy.  We are especially concerned because,
given demographic aging, it is imperative to take steps to increase productivity
and growth, which will enable a smaller working age population  to support a
larger old population. Social security expenditures exceed 10%  of GNP and taxes
exceed 25% of payroll in  many countries  today, and  both numbers will grow in  the
future. It  is hard to  believe that taxes and expenditures of this magnitude will
have no impact  on the broader economy, especially  when we bear in  mind that they
are on top of other taxes and expenditures that deal with population aging (for
example, health and custodial care of the old) and that support other important
public goods.
Some examples: High taxes either mean lower take-home pay for the workers
or higher labor cost for the employer--which could lead employers to substitute
capital  for  labor,  shift  into  less  labor  intensive  products,  become  less
competitive internationally,  and  therefore  hire  fewer  workers. Evasion  and  escape
to the informal labor sector  (where productivity is lower) are large in some
countries, in  part because workers and their employers do not want to pay these
high payroll taxes. The  Atkinson book referred to  by the reviewers finds that in
industrialized countries most of the  payroll taxes are shifted to  workers in the
form of lower pay, hence the employment effects are small. But since payroll
taxes are regressive, the impact on living standards at the bottom end of the
wage distribution may be large. Market imperfections  and the greater possibility
of escape to the informal  sector  may lead  to  less shifting  and greater employment
effects in developing economies.
Current systems may also have led to declining labor force participation
rates among older males, and therefore lower GNP. While generous pensions at an
early  retirement  age  and penalties  for  continued working  after  the  normal
retirement age are certainly not the only reason for this decline, they surely
have been a contributing force. It should be noted that the participation rate
8began to decline in the 1960's, before unemployment became a big problem, but
after current old age programs were put in place.  Indeed, the Atkinson  book
agrees that  pension plans have probably facilitated early retirement. In the US,
for example, retirement jumps discontinuously at ages 62 and 65, when workers
become eligible for partial and full social security, respectively.
The  issue  of  whether  PAYG  systems  have  decreased  saving  is  highly
contentious  and  we  will  probably  never  get  an  unambiguous  answer,  because
economists disagree about the  appropriate counterfactual. However, even if  these
schemes have not decreased saving, a mandatory fully funded plan of sufficient
magnitude will increase  long term  national saving--providing the  government does
not use this as an opportunity to augment its dissaving.  And, countries facing
fiscal difficulties because oL  their large PAYG pension obligations  will be
forced to cut back on the provision of other important public goods or to fuel
inflation by using deficit finance, either of which are bad for growth.
When economic decisions  are distorted and  productivity and  growth decline,
both the old and the young are hurt. Therefore  it is essential that we  take
account of these effects, rather  than  acting as if  they do not exist.  Otherwise,
we are not doing a good job  of protecting the old and those who will grow old in
the future.
In contrast, the Review article apparently holds that high taxes do not
affect  the  behavior  of  workers  or  employers,  that  evasion  can  simply  be
eliminated  by better  enforcement, that people  won't be  induced by generous
pensions to retire early, that there is no effective limit on the government's
ability to finance public goods, and that full funding  can't be used to increase
saving--or else that increased saving isn't important.  (But  here there is an
inconsistency--concern is  expressed about the huge amount of funds that would be
built up under full funding; in fact the authors worry more about the possible
future oversaving than about the undersaving right now).
Perhaps the ISSA/ILO  assumptions are valid in some countries--where there
is a high degree of social cohesion and conformity, a strong work and saving
ethic, a labor  market that facilitates tax shifting to the worker, a willingness
9to comply with  a high  tax regime and  a government  that backs  this up with
effective tax  enforcement. But  unfortunately,  experience  demonstrates that these
assumptions are not valid in  most countries. Our recommendations are designed to
improve old  age systems  as well  as  the broader  economy  in the majority  of
countries where the ILO/ISSA assumptions do not hold.
Equity implications
Moving  on  now,  to  che  distributional  effects  of  current  systems:
Supporters of current systems often point to their stated purpose of poverty
alleviation and their seemingly  progressive benefits formulas,  whereas the World
Bank  report  examined  the  empirical  evidence  on  how  they  actually  work  in
practice, and found this  quite  disappointing on  equity grounds.  In fact,  studies
of lifetime taxes and benefits under social security in several countries show
little if any redistribution from high to low income groups.
Perhaps  this lack of redistribution was necessary  in order to win  the
political support of  high income groups.  Yet, there is a "myth" that social
security  protects low income  groups. Why is there so  much misunderstanding about
this issue?  And, was the  decision about redistribution reached fairly, after an
open discussion among all participants?  The same answer covers both questions:
the non-transparency  of defined  benefit  formulas  limited intra-generational
redistribution and the large inter-generational transfer in  pay-as-you-go plans
enabled both rich and poor to benefit in the early years of old age schemes at
the expense of later cohorts--without a complete understanding by many citizens
about how this would work.
Close examination reveals that most benefit formulas contain a number of
features that chiefly help high income groups:  they generally give a higher
pension to higher wage-earners; they do not take into account  (by charging a
higher risk premium) the longer expected lifetime of high income groups; they
often base the pension on  wages of the  past year or past three years, which gives
an advantage to those with  steeply rising  age-earnings profiles (who  usually are
high earners); they do not give heavier weight to contributions made at an early
age, which therefore have a higher present value at date of retirement  (this
10hurts low earners who had fewer years of schooling); the payroll tax is usually
proportional  to earnings  (in contrast to the progressive  income tax in many
countries); the ubiquitous ceiling on taxable earnings means that at the margin
high earners do not pay the tax; and non-wage income, of which high-earners have
more, is not taxed for social security.
At the same time that intra-generational redistribution from rich to poor
seems to  be absent, intergenerational redistribution  has played a very important
role. In general, the first 20-30 years of workers who retire under a new or
expanded PAYG system  get a positive income  transfer (a  rate of return much higher
than the market rate), while later  generations get a negative income transfer (a
rate  of return lower  than the  market rate)  . Thus the review article is incorrect
in stating that only the last generation to  be covered by a pay-as-you-go scheme
will  lose.  In  fact,  simulations  done  for  OECD  countries  have  shown  that
generations that retire in the first  part of the twenty first century will lose,
because the  present value of their  benefits will be less than the present value
of their contributions.
Both rich and  poor benefited in  the  early  years, accounting in  part for the
reduction of old age poverty that accompanied the expansion of old age systems
in  OECD countries. But the rich  typically  benefited  most of all.  The first  groups
to be covered, who generally receive the  highest returns, tend to be high income
workers.  And the largest income transfers in these early cohorts go to the
highest earners, who have the highest pensionable wage base. As a result, it is
not unusual in industrial countries today to find young low wage workers paying
a high payroll tax to finance a pension and an income transfer for high income
retirees. Poverty reduction among both the young and old will require a more
targeted  distribution of costs  and  benefits in  the future,  as the  income transfer
for the cohort as a whole becomes negative rather than positive.
These inter-cohort redistributions are sometimes justified as resulting
from an intergenerational contract.  But a contract is usually  entered into
voluntarily by  two parties, both of whom expect to gain.  In this case, the
"contract" was voted into existence by the winners, at a time when the losers
11were not born or were not old enough to be politically articulate. This raises
serious questions about the fairness of the political process that set up most
current systems. Apparently neither the  political procedure nor the  empirically-
based equity consequences upset the ISSA or the ILO enough to change its basic
recomtmendation.  Both of these troubled us when we wrote the World Bank report.
Political manipulation and behavioral responses.
The Review article  recommends  design changes  such  as raising the  retirement
age,  eliminating  special  regimes  for privileged  groups,  and  in  some  cases
reducing the  wage  replacement rate, while  retaining  the basic  structure  of
current systems. While supporting the need for such design changes, we do not
believe that this  alone will do the job,  in  part because it fails to take account
of the behavioral response of individuals, citizens and politicians.
For example, the retirement age will have to be raised continuously as
longevity  increases,  but  politicians are likely  to  encounter political resistance
at each round; so even if the retirement age is "fixed" today, the problem will
reappear tomorrow. Privileged  groups will not want to  give up advantages such as
benefit formulas with relatively  generous replacement rates, especially as pay-
offs for the  cohort as a whole decline. If  people feel  they are no longer  getting
a high return from the system, they will evade by "working off the books"--as
many already do.
We need a system that is better insulated from  political manipulation and
behavioral  responses  that reduce contributions or  increase benefits.  In our
recommended system, retirement age increases automatically with longevity  (or
else  the benefit  rate goes  down at  the old  retirement  age)  . Since  defined
contributions are used in  the saving  pillar, people do  not get out  more than they
have put  in, plus  investment income. Redistributions take place  through the
public pillar, in  a very transparent  way, and  with the limited goal of providing
basic income protection. If a person evades contributions, that same individual
(not  others)  loses  his benefits, so  there is  no  unintended redistribution and the
system  is not  placed  in  financial  jeopardy. Private  management  of  pension
reserves  minimizes  opportunities for  appropriation  by  the  government. To  be sure,
12no system is completely immune to the dangers described above, and every system
will function better if  government behaves. But the  structure  we have recommended
contains checks and balances, that place limits on each actor. We believe such
a system is less susceptible to distortions and more sustainable.
Risk aversion and diversification.
Although the  Review article claims  that the  World  Bank report adopts a high
risk  strategy, actually the opposite  is true.  We adopt a very  risk averse
strategy, by recommending a diversified source of retirement income, while the
ISSA and  the  ILO  representatives recommend  a non-diversified  and  therefore
riskier strategy, depending largely on a publicly managed payroll tax financed
system.
None of us  can predict  with certainty  what the  future  will  hold, especially
the long term future,  which is relevant for  old age  planning.  This creates risk,
albeit of different sorts,  both for PAYG DB plans and fully funded  DC plans. For
example, under current defined benefit schemes, the young worker does not know
what his pension will be; it depends on how many years he ends up working, what
his  wage  is during  his last  few years of  employment, and what  changes  the
government decides to make in the  benefit formula  and retirement age between now
and then. (These  changes  may be desirable, but  nevertheless they create risk for
the  worker)  . Pension formulas  are often complex, making it difficult for workers
to estimate how much they will eventually receive.
In a funded defined contribution plan, in contrast, the worker faces the
risk that investment income  may be volatile and low, producing a smaller pension
than expected. The rate of return in the capital market does indeed fluctuate
widely from  year to year, ranging from negacive to highly positive. However, it
should be noted that the average return over long  periods of time (most  relevant
to retirement planning) is much more stable. Government regulations could rule
out the most high-risk investments as vehicles for  mandatory retirement saving.
And historical evidence presented in AvertinQ indicates that the probable rate
of return on capital is  greater than the probable return on contributions to a
pavroll tax financed system, under conditions of slow growth in population and
13wages.
Because both a pay-as-you-go defined benefit scheme and a funded defined
contribution scheme involve risk, of different sorts that are not completely
correlated, we favor  a diversified  system to  minimize this risk.  The benefit from
the saving pillar would depend on investment returns, while the public pillar
would provide a defined  benefit that is financed by a tax on payrolls or broader
revenue  sources.  In contrast, the Review  article  wants  to  stick  to a  more
monolithic defined  benefit  payroll  tax-financed  system that  involves  greater risk
because of the lack of diversification.
Basing  part of  the  system on  capital accumulation  has  the  additional
advantage that some  of it  can  be invested  abroad, which further  diversifies risk.
Suppose the domestic economy falls into a recession, or suppose interest rates
or wages decline--a pension plan that is financed by a payroll tax cannot avoid
these country-specific risks whlile  one that includes capital invested abroad is
partially insulated. Since different countries are aging at different  rates,
international diversification enables pension plans to minimize  the financial
consequences of the  demographic  transition.  While  pensioners from  one country are
selling  the assets  they have acquired  to support  their  retirement,  thereby
lowering  asset prices and  raising  the interest  rate,  workers from  another country
are still accumulating, thereby  stabilizing rates.  Thus international investment
is  a particularly valuable risk-minimizing  device in  the face of the demographic
transition.  The authors of the Review article apparently do not see the value
of diversification.
In sum, if there were no distortionary effects stemming from high taxes,
or evasion by workers and employers, or political pressure for attractive early
retirement provisions,  or fear of misallocated public  resources, or need  to
increase long term national saving, or concern about the lack of redistribution
from rich to  poor, or lack  of concern about intergenerational transfers, or need
to  diversify risks,  old-style  social security  systems favored  by ISSA  and the ILO
would do just fine. But we believe these concerns are present,  serious, and
motivate  a shift to the  multi-pillar  system  described above and at  greater length
14in the report.
III.  Some Miscellaneous Rejoinders
Affordability, sustainability, and the implicit public pension debt
The  review article questions  our  use of these  terms. In  inquiring about the
affordability of a scheme, we are asking whether the costs it imposes on the
economy are greater than the value that the society places on its benefits and,
indeed,  whether the promised benefits can  be financed given the impact on growth
and  taxes.  By nonsustainability we  mean that  the current  benefit and contribution
schedules are  inconsistent with eachother;  either presently  or  in the near
future,  pension obligations will exceed revenues and one or the other will have
to change. An OECD study showed that, for industrialized countries, the current
tax  rate  is  not  nearly  high  enough  to  pay  the  promised  benefits.  Given
demographic aging, this is even more likely to be the case in most developing
countries.
Along similar lines, the implicit public pension debt  (the  present value
of the pension promises made  to current workers and  retirees) is a problem
because the country may have incurred these obligations without fully realizing
the future costs. High and increasing taxes may be needed to cover that debt,
crowding out other important public goods. If the country decides it has made a
mistake, it is  politically very difficult to reverse directions.  And if it does
not reverse directions the debt and revenue  gap will increase still further. In
most industrialized countries the  public pension debt exceeds 100%  of GNP and in
some it  exceeds 200%.  Developing countries now establishing or extending their
systems should be aware that, even if initial cash flow requirements are low,
from  the  beginning PAYG systems  are  building  up a  hidden irreversible  debt, which
will require  high future taxes.  Contrary to  the review  article, the implicit  debt
and the projected cash flow deficit are problems not only  for countries that
choose to  change their systems,  but even  more so for countries that do not reform
rapidly enough.
Notional defined contribution accounts
15In  the past, in  almost  all countries,  defined contribution plans were fully
funded. Contributions  accumulated in the worker's account earning  investment
income, and upon retirement the entire accumulation was turned into a lump sum
payment or pension. However, in the past year several countries  (including
Sweden,  Italy  and  China)  have  begun  experimenting  with  "notional"  defined
contribution plans, which are essentially pay-as-you-go,  so it is no  longer
accurate to  say that  defined contribution  plans  are,  by definition, fully funded.
The basic idea is that a worker's account is set up, as a book-keeping
device, to keep  track of contributions  plus  imputed  interest at a rate determined
by the government, but funds are never accumulated in these accounts. Instead,
the accounts  are notional or empty accounts, since the money is paid out to
current pensioners as soon as it comes in. When the worker reaches retirement
age,  the  notional accumulation  in his or  her account  is  converted  into an
annuity, and paid to the retiree out of contributions by other younger workers,
who are beginning to build their own notional accounts.
Notional accounts  are  very attractive  to countries that  want to  reform but,
because they already have a large public pension debt, find a shift to full
funding  difficult to  achieve.  A plan  based on  notional  accounts accomplishes some
but not all of  the objectives of a reform. It produces  a close  transparent
relationship between contributions and benefits, thereby deterring evasion and
other distortionary behavior.  It eliminates some undesirable  redistributions
within the same cohort of individuals. It automatically adjusts retirement age
up or benefits down as expected lifetimes increase, thereby preventing pension
costs from rising as fast as they would otherwise.
However, so long  as the account remains  notional it  will not increase long
term national saving. It will produce large inter-generational transfers as a
result of demographic change. And the notional interest rate is highly subject
to political manipulation. Since notional do not accumulate assets or generate
investment earnings to cover the promised annuity, they leave governments with
the full responsibility to cover the annuity on a pay-as-you-go basis, and for
this reason  they  continue to require a  sharp rise in payroll  tax rates  as
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Social insurance, annuity pools and redistribution
A crucial question is  whether everyone in the  population should be grouped
together, or whether separate risk  categories should  be utilized for  people with
different life  expectancies.  Current social  security  plans sidestep  this  question
by using a defined benefit formula that depends only on years of service and
average earnings during a specified base period. Because other demographic or
economic factors  related  to  expected longevity (gender,  occupation, total income)
are not included in this formula, implicitly these plans are putting everyone
into  the same  risk category. But this creates  perverse redistributions given the
fact  that high income  people live  longer (and  will therefore receive  benefits for
more years) than low income  people, teachers live longer than miners, etc. This
decision to put everyone into the same risk category and thereby give a large
non-transparent advantage to high income groups was made without an open pubic
discussion of its desirability.
The Review article claims that redistributions to the longer lived (who  on
average  have higher incomes)  are inevitable  in  a  social insurance scheme, whether
public  or private,  that  is designed  to protect people  against  the  risk  of
longevity.  To assess this claim it is necessary to distinguish between ex ante
(expected) transfers and those that result from random differences  in actual
lifetimes.  If expected  lifetimes are  the  same  within a  group,  then  actual
transfers  to  those  who  happen  to  live  longer are  indeed  inevitable  under
longevity insurance--but  these transfers are random; it is impossible to predict
ahead of time who will gain and who will lose. However, if expected lifetimes
differ among individuals and the premiums tney are charged do not reflect their
relative risks, then the winners and losers are predictable ex ante.  Such ex
ante transfers are redistribution, not insurance, and we should think carefully
about whether these redistributions are desirable.
Competition  usually  forces private  insurance companies  to  avoid  such
redistribution, by grouping people according to  observable characteristics that
are correlated with their ex ante risk.  The premium charged is then higher for
17higher risk groups, or for groups where the total insured loss is  greater.  For
example, it is common for young male automobile drivers to be charged a higher
premium than older more experienced drivers and a higher premium is charged to
insure higher value cars against fire  or theft.  If private insurance companies
were  the  dominant  providers  of  annuities,  they  would  probably  compete  for
business  by creating multiple  risk categories in  which miners, for  example, would
pay a lower premium than college professors, because they are expected to live
and collect benefits fewer  years. One virtue of a privately managed DC plan that
converts to an annuity upon retirement is that an explicit discussion is then
needed about  which risk  categories  should  be allowed  and disallowed by  government
regulations.
In contrast, in most public annuity schemes everyone is placed into the
same  risk category, without  open  discussion, so that  some  groups (the  short-lived
high risks) lose, while others (those  with a long expected lifetime) gain. This
is  one of the ways that high income people avoid redistributing to lower income
people in these schemes.
Annuities
The Review article claims that private annuities cannot index pensions
against  inflation,  as public  annuities  can. But  in  fact,  inflation-indexed
annuities are provided privately in Chile. To be sure, they are partly funded
through  the purchase  of  indexed public  bonds,  but  also  partly  through  the
purchase of equities, real estate and (to  a much lesser extent) foreign assets,
that  are likely to  provide inflation  protection. It is  useful to  recall here that
most developing  countries do not provide automatic  inflation adjusted public
pensions. When pensions  are not  inflation-indexed a conflict of  interest is
created: government policies can  produce the inflation from which the government
pension  agencies  benefit  financially,  as  the  real  value  of  their  pension
obligation plummets.
The Review article goes on to list other possible sources of problems in
private annuities markets. It does not explore whether simple mechanisms could
be  developed to offset these problems. For example, lack of financial experience
18among  retirees  can  be  mitigated  by  requiring  insurance  companies  to  offer
standard form contracts, on which  price can more easily be compared. The risk of
a low interest rate on the day when the capital accumulation is turned into an
annuity can  be countered  by allowing  people to  purchase variable annuities (where
the unit value varies as the interest rate changes), or to spread their annuity
purchases over, say, a 20-year period. The latter option would  enable those
people who perceive great risk in defined contribution plans to avoid that risk
by purchasing  fixed annuities  during their working  lives--but  it would  not
require everyone to do so.
Another approach to the interest  rate problem is to  allow retirees to take
out scheduled withdrawals calculated to last an average lifetime.  One problem
with  scheduled withdrawals  is that people  who  live  longer  than  an  average
lifetime  might  be  left without  funds.  This  problem  could  be  resolved  by
requiring people on scheduled withdrawals who die earlier than expected to turn
over a  portion of their  remaining retirement funds to  a  public pool, out of which
an annuity is paid to those who live longer than expected; this self-financing
system  is under consideration in parts of China. Thus,  if private annuities
markets fail to  work well, the  public sector  could  play a role here, but one that
is much smaller than the role it plays today.
Absorptive capacity of capital markets.
The  Review  article  is  concerned  that  the  financial  markets  of  many
countries will  be  unable  to absorb the  large amounts  of  capital  that  will
accumulate under a mandatory saving plan. But it fails to emphasize that many
countries want more saving and, moreover, that the capital accumulation takes
place gradually over time.  Suppose  the required contribution rate is  phased in,
starting at 4% and increasing to 10% over a 7 year period.  Suppose further that
wages are 50% of GNP.  Then, in the first year capital accumulation will be 2t
of GNP and in the second year another 2.5%  will be added, etc. Some of this will
displace other savings, bringing  net capital  accumulation over the first 7  years
to about 20t of GNP.  Countries that do not have the capacity to absorb  this
amount of capital domestically could invest it abroad, wherever the return/risk
19mix is best. This option  was not available to funded plans in  earlier years, but
it has become feasible now due to the development of global capital markets.
Moreover, many countries with limited absorptive capacity probably do not have
the capacity to  handle an ambitious public  pension plan either.  They should  have
a very modest public plan aimed at providing a social safety net and leaving
space for development of a funded pillar later on.
Administrative coats.
The Review article assets that in the US about 35% of contributions to
"commercially managed" personal pension schemes go to administrative costs and
profits, using this as  an argument against such  schemes. It is  not clear what the
authors mean by "commercially managed". Certainly it does not mean mandatory,
where economies of scale and careful regulation would be present, since the US
does not have  such a scheme. Apparently  it also does not mean  occupational
schemes, where only 6% of contributions, or less than 1i of assets, were spent
on  administrative  costs  for  employer-sponsored  plans  with  100  or  more
participants in 1989 in the US. In these plans, income from interest, dividends
and capital  gains was  double the  income from  contributions, and  more than  covered
all the expenditures on benefits as well as administration;  the totality of
contributions went into the accumulated reserves. Much of the administrative
expense, of course, was used to generate this income.
Similarly, in Chile administrative costs of running the mandatory pension
scheme, including the investment of pension reserves, are about 1.8* of assets
or 12%  of new contributions  each year. The  high return on investments (an  average
of 13% of assets during the 1980's)  more than covered these costs and left  an 11l
annual net return that pay-as-you-go publicly managed plans would relish. The
Chilean pension  system is also credited with helping to build the country's
financial markets and therefore its high rate of economic growth. These numbers
are surely an argument for rather than against funded privately managed plans--
their investment income finances the pensions and also represents a net addition
to the capital stock that builds the economy.
Are pay-as-you-go systems financed by contributions or taxes?
20The  Review  article  maintains  that  current  systems  are  financed  by
"contributions" which are superior to the "tax"  financing that we recommend for
the public pillar, because contributions meet  with less  political resistance and
generate  a stronger claim on benefits. In the period when  benefits exceeded
payments  because  of the inter-generational  transfer, most people  were quite
willing  to call their payments  "contributions" that justified their benefits,
even  though  these  lifetime contributions  were  generally  far  less  than  the
lifetime pensions that they received.  However, now that we are entering an era
where benefits, on average,  will be less than lifetime  payments into the scheme,
have only a  weak relationship to these  payments, and could  be increased by opting
out of the system, most people  will know that their  mandatory payments are taxes,
regardless of what we in this journal choose to call them. In fact, the World
bank proposal, which increases  the expected benefit, draws a close connection to
contributions, and gives the worker or employer control over the choice of fund
manager, is more likely to be considered as contribution-financed and to win
popular approval over the long run.
IV. Conclusion
Many OECD countries adopted their current systems  before World War II, at
a time when private financial markets were undeveloped or in disrepute.  These
systems were expanded sharply  in the 1950's  and 1960's,  at a time when real wages
and population were both growing rapidly.  Under these conditions, it seemed
natural to rely on a  publicly-managed  payroll-tax-financed  pay-as-you-go system.
However, the world has changed dramatically over the past 40 years.  Real
wage growth has slowed down and population growth has come to a halt in OECD
countries, so that tax rates will have to go up sharply if  pay-as-you-go systems
are  retained.  It  has  become  increasingly  important  to  minimize  work
disincentives and to increase labor productivity through capital accumulation,
which the public pillar is not well suited to do.  Financial markets are better
developed than they were before and are global in  nature, allowing funded plans
21.to benefit from international diversification.  Under these changed conditions,
shifcing increased responsibility to privately-managed  funded plans that  tie
benefits to contributions is  likely  to  enhance economic  growth and provide higher
benefits than continued exclusive  reliance  on a  payroll-tax-financed pay-as-you-
go system.
In addition, over the past 40 years countries with PAYG defined benefit
plans  have  experienced unanticipated  problems, that  threaten  their  sustainability
in the years ahead.  Developing countries have the advantage that they can learn
from this experience and benefit from the improved global capital market.  But
they must learn fast,  given the rapid rate of demographic aging they face in the
near future. The system that seemed right for OECD countries 40 years ago is
simply not right for developing countries today. If they follow the old path,
they  will  encounter  dramatically  escalating  contribution  rates,  large
intergenerational transfers, and all the other problems described above.
As  for the OECD countries, once having started down the PAYG path and
accumulated large implicit pension debts, it will be very difficult for them to
rapidly reverse directions.  They can, however, make a gradual transition--by
reducing and flattening out the benefits in their public pillars and using the
released resources  (plus  some additional contributions in most cases) to build
funded defined contribution accounts in a new mandatory saving pillar.
The Review article claims it  is unfortunate that the discussion of pension
reform has been mixed  up with  the wider debate about the role of  government, and
one  should  not  expect  pension  systems  to  solve  the  broader  problems  of
underinvestment and low economic  growth.  But this is the crux of the argument:
To analyze what is  an efficient  and  equitable old age system, we have to consider
the appropriate role of government versus the private sector.  And, given the
large  sums of resources involved,  we  have to consider the impact  of these  systems
on the broader economy. Indeed, only by using these systems as well as other
means to  increase economic  growth, can  we  assure a reasonable and  rising standard
of living for the future old and their children.
22We  must also remember that  the "successful"  social security systems of the
industrialized world have just  matured and are about to  confront the demographic
transition. Until now the income transfers have been positive; in the future,
they  are likely to  be negative.  Only the future  will tell  whether the recipients
of these negative transfer consider their systems successful.
We  don't  defend private  schemes as  they  exist.  In  fact, we  are  very
critical of the underfunding, lack of vesting and portability, etc. that are
found  in  unregulated private schemes.  Moreover,  voluntary private  schemes  usually
cover only a minority of the work force, the upper income groups, or they give
better  deals  to  these  groups.  That  is why  we  argue  for  a  system  that  is
mandatory, privately managed but publicly regulated, defined contribution so it
avoids the  problems of  portability, vesting, and  nontransparent redistributions.
Industrialized systems. Many  public systems  in  industrialized countries  do
indeed operate more efficiently than those in developing countries. Evasion is
low because of  better  tax-enforcement capabilities.  Inflation  indexation is
usually included. Administrative costs  tend to  be relatively low for  high income
countries,  whether the  plan is  publicly  or  privately  managed (James  and Palacios,
1995).  But  even  these  well  run  systems  have  not  encouraged  saving,  have
facilitated early retirement, have not redistributed from rich to poor, have
redistributed from the  younger to the older generation, and have run up a huge
social security debt that will require higher taxes in the future.
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